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The Parity Argument for 
Extended Consciousness 
 
Abstract: Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) argue that certain 
mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects 
located beyond one’s brain and body: this is their extended mind thesis 
(EM). But they maintain that consciousness relies on processing that 
is too high in speed and bandwidth to be realized outside the body (see 
Chalmers, 2008, and Clark, 2009). I evaluate Clark’s and Chalmers’ 
reason for denying that consciousness extends while still supporting 
unconscious state extension. I argue that their reason is not well 
grounded and does not hold up against foreseeable advances in 
technology. I conclude that their current position needs re-evaluation. 
If their original parity argument works as a defence of EM, they have 
yet to identify a good reason why it does not also work as a defence of 
extended consciousness. I end by advancing a parity argument for 
extended consciousness and consider some possible replies. 
1. Introduction 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) (C&C, for short) argue that 
objects located beyond one’s brain and body can serve as constitutive 
parts of one’s mental states. In this sense, they argue the mind can 
‘extend’ beyond what are traditionally thought to be its boundaries. But 
they explicitly deny that an agent’s conscious mental states extend. A 
decade later we find that their reason for doing so is their belief that 
consciousness relies on neural processing that is too high in speed and 
bandwidth to possibly be found beyond the brain (in Chalmers, 2008, 
and Clark, 2009). My main objective in this paper is to evaluate C&C’s 
reason for denying that consciousness can extend. 
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To do this I briefly explain C&C’s parity argument for EM (Section 
2). I then critically assess their reason for denying that consciousness 
can extend — a difference in timing and bandwidth between neural and 
extra-neural processes. I argue that the claim is likely false, it does not 
hold up against foreseeable advances in technology and, even if it turns 
out true, C&C still must explain why only conscious states, and not 
unconscious ones, require these features at the neural level (Section 3). 
For these reasons I conclude that C&C’s parity argument supports 
extended consciousness just as well as extended non-conscious states 
(EM). Thus C&C’s current position needs re-evaluation or a new line 
of defence. Finally I advance a parity-style argument for extended 
consciousness and consider some possible replies (Section 
4). 
2. The Parity Argument 
C&C argue that, while minds may be centrally located in one’s brain 
(and body), they can sometimes ‘extend’ to be located in objects 
beyond their core biological shells. So mental properties, according to 
EM, might be attributable to things other than one’s brain or body. To 
defend this against the popular view that the mind is entirely located in 
one’s brain, C&C offer what has since been dubbed the ‘parity 
principle’ (PP, for short), ‘If, as we confront some task, a part of the 
world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would 
have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then 
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.’1 
PP says that we should treat functionally equivalent processes with ‘the 
parity they deserve’, irrespective of whether there are internal or 
external to the brain (C&C, 1998, p. 6). 
C&C then describe several cases in which, they argue, an object in 
the environment does play the same role for an agent that neural 
structures usually would (something we would surely count as a part 
of her mind). Their best known case is that of Otto and Inga: 
First, consider a normal case of belief embedded in memory. Inga hears 
from a friend that there is an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, 
and decides to go see it. She thinks for a moment and recalls that the 
museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 53rd Street and goes into the 
museum… 
Now consider Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and like 
many Alzheimer’s patients, he relies on information in the environment 
to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around with him 
everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. 
 
[1] C&C(1998,p.4). (All references to C&C, 1998, are from the online version, pp.1–12.) 
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When he needs some old information, he looks it up… Otto hears about 
the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides to go see it. He 
consults the notebook, which says that the museum is on 53rd Street, so 
he walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum. (Ibid., p. 11) 
C&C argue that the information in Otto’s notebook ‘functions just like’ 
the information in Inga’s brain that constitutes an ordinary unconscious 
belief. C&C outline several conditions to explain how external 
resources, such as the notebook, function just like internal ones. They 
are conditions that must be met by any resource (internal or external) 
to be considered a part of one’s mind. C&C treat them as independently 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the external resource 
must be a constant in the agent’s life, just as the brain is. Second the 
object must be highly accessible to the agent, as one’s brain is. And 
finally, the agent must rely upon the object, such that he doesn’t 
hesitate to use the information and endorse it as true.2 So C&C argue 
that in cases that meet these conditions, such as Otto with his notebook, 
the object in the environment should count as the constitutive 
machinery of his mind. The parity argument can be summarized as 
follows: 
(P1) What makes some object count as constitutive of a mental state 
is the role it plays. 
(P2) An object beyond an agent’s biological body (e.g. Otto’s 
notebook) can play the same role as an object that surely 
constitutes an ordinary mental state (e.g. Inga’s brain). 
(C) Therefore, an object in an agent’s environment can count as 
partially constitutive of an agent’s mental state. 
Otto and information in his notebook provided an example of an 
extended non-occurrent, unconscious belief state. But, as constructed, 
the parity argument should work just as well for any type of mental 
state (or process). C&C, however, maintain that it is ‘far from 
plausible’ that conscious mental states extend (ibid., p. 7). So 
according to their thesis, EM, only non-conscious mental states can 
extend, while consciousness supervenes only on internal brain states. 
The question is, given that their parity argument seems to support both 
just the same, why do C&C deny extended consciousness? 
 
[2] I use the term ‘object’ loosely here (and throughout). First of all, it is the information in 
the notebook that constitutes Otto’s mental states, not necessarily the entire notebook 
itself. Second, I remain open to the possibility that ‘objects’ could include properties, 
e.g. a particular ordering of objects. 
 
Final draft of a paper published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies,          19 
Vol. 22, No. 3–4, 2015, pp. 16–33   
3. Why Not Extended Consciousness? 
The first glimpse at C&C’s reasoning comes from Chalmers in his 
foreword to Clark’s book. Chalmers says: 
An argument for extended consciousness would require twins with 
different states of consciousness: Olga and Twin Olga are internal 
duplicates, but what it is like to be Olga differs from what it is like to be 
Twin Olga. But no matter how hard one tries to construct an Otto-style 
story that works like this, the story does not seem to succeed. Perhaps 
part of the reason is that the physical basis of consciousness requires 
direct access to information on an extremely high bandwidth. Perhaps 
some future extended system, with high-bandwidth sensitivity to 
environmental information, might be able to do the job. But our low-
bandwidth conscious connection to the environment seems to have the 
wrong form as it stands. (Chalmers, 2008, p. 6) 
Thus, Chalmers reasons that consciousness does not extend because of 
some crucial difference in information processing features — speed, 
access, and bandwidth — between neural and extra-neural processes. 
He suggests that consciousness requires bandwidth and processing 
speeds that are in excess of what can possibly be met by any extra-
neural resources. And although Chalmers adds, ‘there is no principled 
reason why the physical basis of consciousness could not be extended’, 
he ‘tentatively’ concludes that EM is compatible with a denial of 
extended consciousness (ibid., p. 6). 
Clark (2009) subsequently endorsed Chalmers’ suggested 
distinction.3 Clark explains that consciousness may require ‘certain 
information-accessing and information-integrating operations whose 
temporal scale makes neural processes (just as a matter of contingent 
fact, in us humans) the only adequate “vehicle”’(Clark, 2009, p. 983). 
Clark cites the work of Chris Eliasmith (2008), who argues that the 
essential difference between neural and extra-neural dynamics is the 
‘speed of information flow (i.e. bandwidth), and the degree and kind 
of coupling’.4 The idea is that our non-neural body is slower at 
transferring information to and from the world to the brain and so acts 
as a ‘low-pass filter’ — a physical medium that allows certain low- 
 
[3] Clark (2009, p. 983) writes, ‘Chalmers (2008) does not develop this suggestion, but the 
direction seems promising’. It’s worth noting that in this article Clark does not consider 
a parity argument for extended consciousness. Instead he considers arguments for 
extended consciousness based on ‘dynamic processing loops’ and enactivist views of 
mind. I don’t discuss these because I think none is as strong as C&C’s own parity 
argument. 
[4] Eliasmith goes on, ‘Because bodies have mass, they tend to slow down the transfer of 
information to the world from  the brain (i.e.they effectively act as a low-pass filter). 
However, no such impediment to information flow exists between brain areas’ 
(Eliasmith, 2008, p. 150, quoted in Clark, 2009, p. 984). 
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frequency signals to pass through, while blocking higher-frequency 
signals (Clark, 2009, p. 985). According to C&C this crucial difference 
between the neural and the extra-neural gives reason to reject P2 in a 
parity argument for extended consciousness. It explains why neural 
processes alone constitute consciousness while all other kinds of 
processes in the body and environment do not, though they may 
provide crucial causal support for neural processes. 
3.i. Interpretations of and responses to C&C’s claim 
C&C’s claim is a descriptive one, that just as a matter of contingent 
empirical fact, in order for consciousness to come about its physical 
realizers must be able to transmit and receive information with direct 
access and at a high speed and bandwidth. And this is why neural 
processes alone are able to perform the job — because they alone are 
able to instantiate these unique information processing features which 
consciousness requires. I will develop three interpretations of this 
claim and argue each is likely false. 
(a) Perhaps the claim is that neurons require and in fact have 
direct access to information from other neurons on an extremely high 
bandwidth but that the same is not true of non-neural processes. That 
is, the rate of information sharing that can take place between two 
neurons can never be matched between any two non-neural objects. 
But this is surely false. This would amount to the claim that no non-
neural system could ever process information at the speeds of our 
brains; that connections between two silicon chips, for example, could 
never reach the connections between two neurons. But non-neural 
computation can already occur at speeds that exceed brain operations. 
For example, computers are capable of executing more operations per 
second than the biological brain can. 
(b) Recall Chalmers also says ‘our low-bandwidth conscious 
connection to the environment seems to have the wrong form as it 
stands’ (ibid., p. 6). So perhaps what he means is that neurons require 
and in fact have direct access to information from other neurons on an 
extremely high bandwidth, but the same is not true between neurons 
and non-neurons. On this interpretation, a neuron can never transfer 
information to any kind of non-neuron at a high enough rate or speed 
for the non-neuron to play the same role as neurons do. So the concern 
is not whether connections between two silicon chips, for example, 
could reach the speed of neurons, but rather whether a silicon chip and 
a neuron could ever connect in the same way (or with the same speed 
and bandwidth) as two neurons connected to each other. This  
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interpretation better accords with Chalmers’ description of our ‘our 
low-bandwidth conscious connection to the environment’ and with 
Clark’s description of the body as a ‘low-pass filter’. 
But, at least in one sense of the term, extra-neural to neural 
‘information processing’ already happens at sufficiently high speeds to 
make this claim false. For example, one form of information exchange 
is visual. We know that our conscious states represent visual 
information that comes in from beyond our brain in a rapidly changing 
manner. Information about the surfaces of objects is transferred when 
light hits the eye, which is subsequently transmitted to the brain. But 
the brain, which cannot transfer or receive information at the speed of 
light, slows this information processing down. So non-neural processes 
must be constantly reporting information back to the brain, through the 
low-pass filter Clark describes, at least as quickly as neural processes 
can operate. 
At one point Clark acknowledges the fact that extra-neural bodily 
‘goings-on’, such as muscular processes, must be a source of input in 
order for us to experience things like muscular action — an occurrent 
bodily process that has real-time impact on our conscious experience 
(Clark, 2009, p. 985). But he never explicitly considers the timescale 
at which these operations must occur in order for this to happen. He 
never addresses why, if the connections between neural and extra-
neural processes are sufficient to cause real-time changes in the 
character of our phenomenal experience, they should not also be 
sufficient to constitute our conscious experience. The 
phenomenological evidence suggests that differences in processing 
speeds between neurons and non-neurons may not be relevant in 
determining their contributions to bringing about higher-level 
phenomenal conscious experiences. That is, even if extra-neural 
connections are relatively slower than inter-neural connections, they 
nonetheless suffice to realize a stream of consciousness that represents 
information from the outside in approximately real time. 
(c) Finally, it is possible that the key difference between neural 
and extra-neural for C&C is really about ‘direct access’.5 It could be 
that neural processes do not have ‘direct access to information’ from 
nonneural processes. But the information sharing between neurons is 
direct, or unmediated. Here the same kind of response will do: even if 
extra-neural connections are relatively less direct than intra-neural 
connections, they nonetheless suffice to realize a stream of conscious- 
 
[5]    Thanks to David Chalmers for elaborating on this point in response to a presentation of 
this paper. 
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ness that processes information from the outside in approximately real 
time. If the claim is that our biological body has direct (unmediated) 
access to environmental information, but any add-on or ‘extension’ 
would not, this too seems false. After all, the access that my biological 
perceptual system has to visual information coming in from the 
environment is no more (or less) direct than the glasses I wear. 
So C&C’s claim can’t come down to (a) a difference in speed and 
bandwidth between neural processing and non-neural processing, since 
computers can already process information at greater speeds than our 
brains. It can’t come down to (b) a difference in speed and bandwidth 
connection between the neural and non-neural processes, since we 
know information from the environment must flow in at sufficiently 
high speeds. And finally, it can’t be about a difference in (c) the ‘direct 
access’ of information, since the access that a biological perceptual 
system has to information from the environment is no more direct than 
an extended perceptual system, including a pair of glasses or corrective 
lenses. At least these three plausible interpretations of C&C’s claim 
appear false. And it is unclear what else they might mean. 
3.ii. In principle, speed and bandwidth don’t matter 
Another problem is that even if there is some interpretation that makes 
C&C’s claim true in principle, features like speed and bandwidth just 
don’t seem to matter. It’s at least not obvious why lower, 
implementation-level features such as speed and bandwidth would 
matter to states at higher levels. In a well-functioning system, parts that 
realize that system may move at entirely different speeds. So long as 
each part plays its role at the right time, the system can function 
seamlessly.6 Just as all the bits of a mechanical wristwatch may move 
around in different ways — you wind the spring, moving the gears, 
which turns the wheels forward. The parts work together, albeit at 
different times and with varying sorts of connections, to realize the 
whole functioning system. 
Likewise, processes external to the brain do not in principle have to 
be as fast as neural processes to function with them in a larger system. 
They just have to play their particular role at the right time. Since we 
know that extra-neural processes interact with neural processes quickly 
enough to bring about real-time changes, it is consonant with our 
phenomenology that they also constitute our conscious experiences. So 
merely citing the bandwidth differences between the neural 
 
[6] Thanks to Ian Gold for this way of thinking about the problem. 
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and extra-neural (while possibly true) is not relevant precisely because 
the speeds of neural and non-neural activity are manifestly appropriate 
to allow for the necessary interactions required. Thus even if C&C’s 
empirical premise is true they still need to explain why these lower-
level features are essential for bringing about conscious mental states, 
since it’s not obvious why this should matter. There is one further 
problem with C&C’s strategy to reject extended consciousness. 
3.iii. Why isn’t high bandwidth also necessary for non-conscious 
states? 
Suppose that there are grounds for asserting that there is an important 
distinction between neural and non-neural processes. In order to use 
this as an objection against a parity argument for extended 
consciousness C&C still need to explain why differences in speed and 
bandwidth are relevant only to bringing about conscious states and not 
unconscious ones. Otherwise C&C risk handing over a strong 
objection against their own original argument for EM. 
Consider the ‘coupling-constitution’ objection that Frederick 
Adams and Kenneth Aizawa (henceforth, A&A) raise to C&C’s parity 
argument for EM.7 A&A(2001) argue that C&C mistake the coupling 
of extra-neural resources to neural activity for their constitutive 
involvement in unconscious mental states. A&A argue that the mere 
coupling of a resource to a cognitive system does not imply the 
resource is constitutive of cognition. For example, the circulatory 
system is coupled to the cognitive system, i.e. circulation causally 
supports cognition, but circulation does not constitute cognition (A&A, 
2008, pp. 10–11). 
Clark (2005) responds that the burden of proof lies with A&A to 
come up with a principled reason, one that doesn’t beg the question 
against EM, for maintaining that all mental states (even unconscious 
ones) are entirely constituted by neural resources and only causally 
supported by extra-neural ones. It is to this end that A&A(2005) argue 
that original, or non-derived, intentionality is the distinguishing ‘mark 
of the mental’. Original, or non-derived, intentionality is meant to 
contrast with the derived intentionality that non-mental objects can 
display. So while non-mental objects, such as the words in a book, e.g. 
Otto’s notebook, may display derived intentionality, original inten- 
 
[7] See Adams and Aizawa (2001; 2008). 
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tionality is uniquely a feature of minds.8 Thus, A&A argue that the 
notebook fails to be partially constitutive of Otto’s mind because it 
lacks this ‘mark of the mental’ that — just as a matter of current 
contingent fact — only brains can realize.9 
What is important to notice about this exchange between A&A and 
C&C is that C&C use the same strategy to object to extended 
consciousness that A&A first use against the parity argument for EM. 
So if Clark is right about where the burden of proof lies in his response 
to A&A, then he must accept that the burden of proof lies with him 
(and Chalmers) in rejecting P2 of the same argument for extended 
consciousness. If A&A must come up with a principled reason for 
asserting their coupling-constitution objection against P2 of the parity 
argument for EM, then for C&C’s parallel strategy to work they too 
must find some principled reason for distinguishing between the 
contributions of neural and extra-neural processing. As we’ve seen, 
Chalmers (2008) has offered such a reason and Clark (2009) develops 
it, but I’ve argued that their claim is false on all plausible 
interpretations. Now, even if they turn out to be right, they must explain 
why high bandwidth does not equally pose an objection to their claim 
that non-conscious states can extend, otherwise the objection to 
extended consciousness will work just as well against EM. 
Surely aware of this, Clark asks: ‘When does such a difference [in 
bandwidth] make a difference?’ He replies: ‘Not, we can reasonably 
assume, in the case of non-occurrent states such as dispositional 
believings.’10 Clark maintains that differences in speed and bandwidth 
only concern the substrates of conscious states, and not unconscious 
states. He argues that the contents of non-occurrent mental states do 
not require the high-speed, ‘moment-by-moment’ construction that the 
rapidly changing phenomenal characters of conscious states do. He 
says, ‘it may be that synchrony correlates with attention, and that 
attentional modulation is what allows information to pass 
 
[8] This distinction has been around for some time, see e.g. Searle (1992). 
[9] I won’t respond to A&A’s objection here. But notice that even if the objection works 
against the example of Otto and his notebook, their distinction would not block all 
possible cases of EM. We can imagine that instead of using a notebook Otto uses the 
mind of another agent, e.g. his long-time partner, to store the information that forms 
his beliefs. In this case the external resource is itself a brain, so it would be capable of 
original intentionality. The result would be an instance of a socially extended mind — 
where one agent’s mind has extended into another’s. (It’s called ‘social’ because two 
distinct minds are involved. So it’s not the case that if A’s mind extends into B’s there 
is now just one mind; rather, A and B maintain separate minds.  Only A’s mind is now 
partially constituted by information stored in B.) 
[10] And Clark cites work by W. Singer (2003) ‘for some of the evidence for this 
conjecture’ (Clark, 2009, p. 984). 
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from perceptual buffers to working memory in the way that gives rise 
to conscious experience’.11 So only conscious states depend on the very 
precise (down to the millisecond) temporal synchronies of the brain, as 
a means of binding together and transferring distinct bodies of 
neurologically represented information. 
But it is not obvious why conscious and unconscious processes must 
rely on fundamentally different kinds of (neural) processes. The 
content of unconscious but occurent mental states could be changing 
just as rapidly as our conscious states, for all we know, only not at the 
level of our awareness. For example, expert behaviour happens quickly 
and unconsciously, e.g. the motor skills used in driving a car. The 
processes involved here are unconscious but still work fast enough to 
control our real-time behaviours. There is no evidence that this speed 
and high bandwidth is not also necessary for rapid changes in our 
unconscious processing. So high speed and bandwidth at the neural 
level might be also necessary for our unconscious processing. There is 
yet no decisive evidence that conscious and unconscious processes rely 
on fundamentally different kinds of (neural) processes. 
I conclude that the principled distinction that C&C offer to reject 
extended consciousness does not hold up under close scrutiny. 
Moreover, if their principled distinction did hold up it would also give 
a reason to reject EM too, along with extended consciousness. Thus, 
even if C&C can offer an interpretation of their claim that picks out a 
real distinction between neural and non-neural processes, they must 
still find a principled distinction between conscious and unconscious 
processes that can explain why only the former and not the latter 
require the unique features of neurons to be constituted. Only then will 
C&C be able to consistently defend EM from an Adams-and-Aizawa-
style coupling-constitution objection, while at the same time objecting 
to extended consciousness on similar grounds. 
4. The Parity Argument for the 
Extended Conscious Mind Thesis (ECM) 
So far it looks as though C&C’s parity argument supports the view that 
conscious mental states can extend just as well as it supports their 
original thesis, EM. I will call this the extended conscious mind thesis 
(ECM). Here is the parity argument for ECM: 
 
[11] Clark cites Thiele and Stoner (2003) and Lamme and Spekreijse (1998) as support 
(Clark, 2009, p. 984). 
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(P1) What makes some object count as constitutive of a conscious 
mental state is the role it plays. 
(P2) An object beyond an agent’s biological body can play the 
same role as an object that surely constitutes an ordinary 
conscious mental state. 
(C) Therefore, an object in an agent’s environment can count as 
partially constitutive of an agent’s conscious mental state.12 
To support P2 of the argument for EM, C&C offer some examples, 
including Otto and his notebook. To help make sense of what kind of 
object beyond an agent’s body might play the same role as the agent’s 
brain, I start with the example of the iCog. 
4.i. The iCog 
Consider the Silicon Brain thought experiment.13 Imagine a situation 
where your brain is deteriorating and in a medical effort to heal you 
doctors begin to replace some of your natural neurons with silicon 
chips. These silicon chips have been programmed to perform all the 
same functions of the neurons they are replacing. They work as 
‘artificial neurons’. We can imagine this replacement process 
continues until no part of your original biological brain remains. 
Philosophers have different views about what will happen to their 
mental life while this goes on. 
Role functionalists maintain that if the chips really do perform all of 
the same functions as the neurons they replace, then your mental life 
will not be impacted, not by simply changing the physical realizers. 
Now, the first premise of the parity argument (P1) is meant to follow 
from the PP, which Chalmers (2008) says commits one to ‘very weak 
functionalism’.14 More specifically, Brie Gertler (2007) argues that the 
PP(and something like P1) commits one to role functionalism.15 If role 
functionalism is right, then it should not matter where these silicon 
chips are or what they are made of, as long as they are responsible for 
performing the functional role that realizes mental states. 
 
[12] My presentation of C&C’s parity argument is based on Gertler’s (2007) longer 
summary of the argument. 
[13] See Searle (1982; 1997). 
[14] Chalmers(2008)doesn’t  say exactly  what  kind of functionalism he has in mind, 
though he says, ‘One might support the view by invoking an attenuated functionalism: 
say, one where certain mental states (such as dispositional beliefs) are defined by their 
causal relations to conscious states, to behavior, and to other elements of the cognitive 
network’ (p.7). 
[15] At the very least PP depends on the multiple realizability thesis (MRT) — the view 
that mental states are multiply realizable. Wheeler (2010) agrees. 
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Now imagine that instead of entering your skull to replace your 
deteriorated neurons where they are, doctors consider it preferable and 
less intrusive to the biological shell to do as much as they can 
externally. So doctors tell you it will be safer to attach your remaining 
well-functioning neurons through tiny electrical nodes to an implant 
that threads a wire out your ear. They then attach this wire to an 
external device that contains your programmed silicon chips and which 
attaches to your person. We can imagine that after the operation you 
come to with a small wire now reaching out of one of your earholes. 
Attached to this wire is a small device that hugs your ear, much like a 
hearing aid. Doctors call it an iCog. 
Of course the iCog is not currently available and may never be. My 
claim is that iCogs are conceivable and that they are logical and 
metaphysical possibilities. Furthermore, iCogs would be objects in an 
agent’s environment — beyond her biological brain-and-body — that 
function just like the objects constituting the agent’s ordinary 
conscious mental states (i.e. the neurons in her brain). I claim that 
iCogs are possible cases of ECM. Thus even if C&C’s claim about the 
uniqueness of neural processes turns out to be contingently true, which 
I’ve given reasons to doubt, it seems at least pre-emptive to rule this 
out as a possible advance in technology. 
To be fair, Chalmers mentions the possibility of a ‘future extended 
system’(Chalmers, 2008, p. 6). So he should be receptive to the iCog 
as a future possibility. But he says, ‘it is unlikely that any everyday 
process akin to Otto’s interaction with his notebook will yield extended 
consciousness, at least in our world’. And, as I’ve noted, Clark says 
that consciousness requires these unique features ‘just as a matter of 
contingent fact, in us humans’ (Clark, 2009, p. 983). So Clark too 
should admit the possibility that technology might advance to the point 
where this contingent fact changes. 
4.iii. Responses to the parity argument for ECM and the iCog 
(a) Does the argument (or example) beg the question? 
One might worry that the iCog begs the question by assuming that 
parity will one day be possible. I use the parity argument that C&C 
give to defend EM to support ECM. So if the parity argument for ECM 
begs the question then Otto’s notebook may do the same. And of 
course the iCog meets the tentative conditions that have been set out 
for an external resource: it is a constant in the agent’s life, the agent 
accesses information from the iCog regularly, and relies on this  
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information, endorsing it as true without hesitation.16 But silicon-
processing may turn out to be incapable of achieving the processing 
features of natural neurons, so the silicon iCog does rely on future 
possibility in a way that Otto’s notebook doesn’t — more on this in the 
next section, with the neuron-based iCog. 
(b) Can parity be achieved? 
C&C could continue to argue that the iCog will never be able to reach 
the high speeds and bandwidth connections of the brain. The electrical 
connections from neurons to a silicon iCog would be too slow. But of 
course, the iCog doesn’t have to be made of silicon and the connection 
doesn’t have to be electrical. What is important to the thought 
experiment is that we can imagine a device of this kind, located beyond 
the brain and body, fulfilling the role of neurons in the brain. So even 
if incredibly high speed and bandwidth connections turn out to be 
crucial features in realizing consciousness, it seems entirely possible 
that with advances in technology these could be features of some kind 
of non-biological materials as well. Now, C&C might give up their 
claim about speed and bandwidth but continue with their strategy of 
rejecting P2 of the parity argument by identifying some other 
principled distinction between neural and non- neural processes. But 
to do so they’d still need to find a way to block a corresponding 
objection to their own parity argument for EM. 
Moreover, the iCog could itself be made of neurons. Either 
artificially made or naturally occurring biological neurons could be 
connected through one’s ear by a long axon, also naturally occurring. 
If the iCog just turns out to be a clump of neurons attached to one’s 
ear, by an axon or by a string of more neurons, then speed, bandwidth, 
or access can’t possibly be relevant.17 So in this case C&C can no 
longer appeal to a distinction between neural and non-neural 
processing. Since the brain and the iCog would both be composed of 
neurons, the entire realization-base of consciousness would still be  
 
[16] Zoe Drayson (2011) has argued that these conditions are meant to characterize only 
mental states of a particular kind, namely dispositional beliefs. This is the kind of 
mental state that C&C are describing when giving these conditions — the state that is 
realized by the information in Otto’s notebook. (I would add that C&C are even more 
precise that the kind of mental state they describe in Otto’s case is a non-occurrent, 
non-conscious belief state.) So the conditions were never intended to  be  independently 
necessary and jointly sufficient for all kinds of mental states. But since I don’t set out 
here to provide new conditions for resources that constitute conscious states, I use 
them, tentatively. 
[17] The neuron-based iCog reminds us that EM and ECM are about where the mind is, not 
what the mind is. So although C&C’s parity argument, in particular P1, relies on 
functionalism and MRT (as Wheeler, 2010, Gertler, 2007, and others have argued) the 
two views need not and may be supportable on other grounds. 
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purely neural, only part of it would lie beyond the brain-and-body. So 
C&C would be hard pressed to find a principled distinction between 
the neuron-based iCog and the neurons in the brain that doesn’t just 
come down to a difference between inner and outer. And this is just 
what their PP is meant to work against. 
It’s worth adding that Chalmers (2008) should be receptive to the 
conceivability of the neuron-based iCog, as he says ‘…in some 
possible worlds: one could imagine that some of the neural correlates 
of consciousness are replaced by a module on one’s belt, for example’ 
(Chalmers, 2008, p. 6). So, to reiterate, the resistance is over whether 
or not consciousness could extend in our world, and whether or not it 
is currently extending.18 
(c) Direct perceptual access: the dual boundaries of perception 
and action 
Chalmers (2008) suggests one way to pressure EM is by appealing to 
the dual boundaries of perception and action. He says: ‘It is natural to 
hold that perception is the interface where the world affects the mind, 
and that action is the interface where the mind affects the world. If so, 
it is tempting to hold that what precedes perception and what follows 
action is not truly mental’ (Chalmers, 2008, p. 3). The line of reasoning 
goes: 
(P1) The boundaries that separate the mind from the external 
environment are the dual interfaces of perception and action. 
(P2) One perceives through bodily senses and acts through bodily 
motions. 
(C) Thus, the mind is brain-and-body bound. 
A version of the argument directed against ECM would replace 
mention of ‘the mind’ with ‘consciousness’. If the key difference 
between neural and extra-neural for C&C is really ‘direct access’,19 the 
argument against ECM would be that our bodies receive ‘direct access 
to information’ from the world and that no extension to our brain would 
be able to replicate this natural interface. Since the iCog is not 
responsible for any perception it does not challenge either P1 or P2 of 
the above argument. 
 
[18] And notice, again, that this parallels A&A’s position in resisting EM — A&A argue 
not that mind could not extend in any possible world, just that as a matter of 
contingent fact they do not extend in our world. 
[19] Returning to an interpretation of C&C’s claim discussed before, in C of Section 3.i. 
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I think the best way to respond is to accept P1, at least tentatively, 
but to argue that these interfaces are not stuck at the body, but can shift. 
So P2 is challenged by the example of corrective lenses. I argued 
before that the access that my eyes have to visual information coming 
in from the environment is no more (or less) direct than the corrective 
lenses placed on top of them. So one might perceive not just through 
the body, but through an extended perceptual system that includes their 
lenses. Recall Chalmers (2008) says: ‘An argument for extended 
consciousness would require twins with different states of 
consciousness: Olga and Twin Olga are internal duplicates, but what it 
is like to be Olga differs from what it is like to be Twin Olga.’ Imagine 
that Olga and Twin Olga are internal duplicates at time t, but what it is 
like to be Olga at t differs from what it is like to be Twin Olga at t 
precisely because Olga is wearing her corrective glasses, while Twin 
Olga hasn’t put hers on yet. Without lenses both Olga’s have very poor 
vision. So for Olga at t the world appears clearly and this has a 
particular quale. But for Twin Olga at t the world is a blurry, less 
welcoming place — one with very few affordances for action — and 
this has a different quale. 
There is another way to challenge P2. Consider something like the 
neuron-based iCog that includes an extension of our perceptual 
apparatus. First imagine a transplanted hand, made of naturally 
occurring cells. Now imagine a bionic hand made from some kind of 
artificial material. In both cases the agent comes to perceive and to act 
through resources which lie beyond the natural biological body of the 
agent. Thus they would challenge P2. 
(d) Reject P1 of the parity argument for ECM 
A final consideration is that C&C could reject P1 of the parity 
argument for ECM. They could maintain that conscious states, unlike 
unconscious ones, cannot be individuated by their functional or causal 
roles. Chalmers (1996) argues that a reductive explanation of 
consciousness fails precisely because it cannot be analysed 
functionally. Thus, a complete functional analysis of the mind would 
not suffice to capture consciousness. One might think it would be a 
natural strategy for Chalmers to reject P1 of ECM, but we’ve seen that 
P1 is meant to follow from C&C’s own PP. So to reject P1 while 
advancing PPwould require some explanation. 
And we’ve seen this is not C&C’s strategy. Chalmers (2008) 
maintains that EM does not commit one to any strong version of 
functionalism. He explains: 
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I think that functionalism about consciousness is implausible, for 
example, but this implausibility does not affect the arguments for the 
extended mind thesis. One might support the view by invoking an 
attenuated functionalism: say, one where certain mental states (such as 
dispositional beliefs) are defined by their causal relations to conscious 
states, to behavior, and to other elements of the cognitive network. 
(Chalmers, 2008, p. 7) 
So Chalmers argues that all one needs is the ‘very weak functionalism’ 
captured in PP, combined with something like P2, and the thesis 
follows.20 This may explain why Chalmers’ strategy to reject ECM is 
to argue that an object located beyond an agent’s biological body is 
never functionally equivalent with neurons in the brain — an objection 
to P2. 
5. Conclusion 
I’ve argued that the position Clark and Chalmers take in defending the 
extended mind thesis (EM) about unconscious mental states while 
denying that consciousness extends (the thesis of ECM) does not work. 
The principled reason they offer to distinguish between the 
contributions of neural vs. extra-neural processes — a difference 
between timing and bandwidth — does not hold up against the test of 
foreseeable advances in technology, nor does it hold up against 
phenomenological reflection. This means that if their original parity 
argument works as a defence of EM, they have yet to identify a good 
reason why it should not also work just as well as a defence of ECM. 
Finally, one popular way to object to EM has been to deny that 
unconscious states are really a part of the mind at all, and to instead 
contend that all of our mental states are conscious. C&C (1998) say 
this is the most consistent way to deny their thesis. In this case it would 
continue to be true that the information in Otto’s notebook counts as 
his standing beliefs, but since standing beliefs are not a part of one’s 
mind, in no sense would the mind extend. But if the parity argument 
supports conscious mental state extension just as well as unconscious 
state extension then this strategy to reject EM is off the table. Since 
even if one denies that unconscious states are really a part 
 
[20] Chalmers (2008, p. 7): ‘Combined with the observation that there are no relevant 
differences in the relevant cases — an observation that does not require functionalism 
for its support — the thesis follows.’ I’m not sure I agree with Chalmers about this, but 
I don’t take this point up here. 
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of the mind (a claim that, for many, is radical), one still needs to find a 
reason to deny that conscious states can extend.21 
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